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I. 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann., § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
II. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Appellant St. Benedict's Development Company 
("Develpment Company") brought this action seeking to recover 
damages and to enjoin Respondents St. Benedictfs Hospital 
("Hospital") and The Boyer Company ("Boyer") from constructing 
an office building on property owned by Hospital which is 
adjacent to St. Benedict's Hospital and also adjacent to certain 
office buildings constructed on land leased by Development 
Company from the Hospital in Ogden, Utah. Development Company 
also sought damages for an alleged tortious interference with 
business relationships. 
Boyer and the Hospital both moved to dismiss the 
Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could 
be granted. The court granted the motions and the Order of 
Dismissal was signed September 28, 1989. Development Company 
filed its Notice of Appeal on October 16, 1989. 
III. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review on this 
appeal. 
1. Did the District Court commit error in dismissing 
Development Company's claim which sought to prevent the Hospital 
and Boyer from constructing an office building on the Hospital's 
property where no restrictive covenant existed between the 
Hospital and Development Company by which the Hospital agreed 
not to construct such a building and where there was no basis 
for implying such a covenant? 
2. Did the District Court commit error in dismissing 
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Development Company's claim for tortious interference with 
business relations where there were no factual allegations that 
in negotiating with the Hospital to construct an office building 
on the Hospital's property or soliciting tenants to rent space 
in the proposed new building Boyer acted for an improper purpose 
or with improper means? 
IV. 
INTRODUCTION 
Development Company filed this lawsuit to try to obtain 
from the courts the benefit of a bargain which Development 
Company itself never made or paid for with the Hospital. 
Development Company sought to be protected from legitimate 
competition for tenants in Development Company's office 
buildings located on land adjacent to, and leased from, St. 
Benedict's Hospital. Without any colorable basis for doing so, 
Development Company added Boyer as a Defendant — a company with 
whom Development Company never dealt or had any relationship. 
Development Company sought compensatory and punitive damages and 
an injunction against Boyer without any factual allegations of 
wrongdoing on Boyer's part solely because Boyer negotiated with 
the Hospital to construct another office building near St. 
Benedict's Hospital and announced its plans to Development 
Company's tenants and the public. 
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For the reasons hereinafter set forth, it is 
respectfully submitted that the District Court properly 
dismissed the Complaint and properly refused to award 
Development Company a judicially-mandated monopoly. That 
dismissal should be affirmed. 
V. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 
Development Company commenced this action in June, 1989, 
seeking injunctive relief and damages. Development Company 
alleged in conclusory fashion that the activity of the Hospital 
and Boyer in planning to construct an office building adjacent 
to St. Benedict's Hospital somehow breached the Hospitalfs prior 
agreements with Development Company. 
As previously stated, Boyer and the Hospital both filed 
motions to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that the 
Complaint failed to state a claim for relief. After extensive 
briefing and oral argument, the court, the Honorable David E. 
Roth, granted the motions. The Order of Dismissal was signed on 
September 28, 1989. 
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B. STATEMENT OF FACTS, 
The motions to dismiss were granted solely on the basis 
of the allegations of the Complaint• Of course, the well-pled 
factual allegations of the Complaint must be accepted as true 
for the purposes of this appeal. The essential allegations of 
the Complaint can be summarized as follows: 
1. On or about July 6, 1977, the Hospital, as lessor, 
entered into a lease with Development Company's predecessor, by 
the terms of which the Hospital leased a portion of its real 
property immediately adjacent to the Hospital facility to the 
lessee to construct, maintain and operate a medical professional 
building and other facilities related thereto. [R. 2] 
2. The lease was intended for the mutual benefit of the 
parties and to benefit the Hospital in providing facilities for 
medical staff using the facilities of the Hospital for the care 
and treatment of patients. [R. 3] 
3. The lease was for a period of 51 years at a rate of 
$1.00 per year, which nominal rental was in recognition of the 
fact that an office building in close proximity to the Hospital 
was essential to the success of the Hospital. The Hospital was 
given a right of first refusal to purchase the leasehold 
interest of the lessee in the event the lessee decided to sell. 
[R. 3-4] 
4. At all times since the lease was entered into, the 
parties acted upon the "express and implied condition and 
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understanding" that the operation of the Hospital and office 
building would be conducted "for the mutual economic advantage 
and benefit of the parties" and "that neither party would 
conduct itself in such a way as to cause diminution of patients 
of the Hospital or tenants of the professional building." [R. 
5-6] 
5. On or about June 22, 1979, the parties signed an 
additional agreement providing for the construction of a second 
office building to accommodate other medical doctors and related 
professionals. In that second agreement, the Hospital agreed 
that it would "actively assist the partnership in acquiring and 
holding good tenants until such time as the new office building 
is completely occupied," and guaranteed payment of rent for a 
third of the net leasable area of the new office building until 
the new office building was two-thirds occupied. [R. 6-7] 
There is no allegation in the Complaint that the Hospital did 
not actively assist the partnership in acquiring tenants until 
the new office building was occupied or failed to meet its 
guaranty obligation. 
6. On December 14, 1981, the parties entered into a 
Replacement Lease with respect to the second property wherein 
the parties reconfirmed their mutual interest in Development 
Company constructing and maintaining professional offices and 
facilities for the use and benefit of doctors engaged in 
treating their patients at the Hospital. Development Company 
agreed that insofar as practical and subject to tenant demand, 
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tenancies in the professional building would be limited to 
members of the professional staff of the Hospital. [R. 7-8] 
7. On December 14, 1981, Development Company and the 
Hospital entered into a Declaration of Restrictions, Easements 
and Common Area Maintenance Agreement. In the preamble of that 
agreement, the parties stated their intention that the parcels 
be developed for the mutual benefit of the parties and therefore 
they desired to establish a general plan for the development of 
the parcels. [R. 8-9] 
8. Finally, Development Company alleged that at the 
time of filing of the Complaint, it had five vacancies in its 
building and that there were no reasonable sources of tenants to 
occupy the proposed facility to be built by Boyer without taking 
tenants from the Development Company's buildings, that 
unspecified tenants have notified the Development Company they 
do not intend to renew their leases, but will occupy the spaces 
on a month to month basis only until the new building is 
completed, and that there was no need for an additional 
professional building to serve the needs of the doctors 
utilizing and practicing at the Hospital. [R. 11-12] 
9. By virtue of the foregoing allegations, Development 
Company alleges in a totally conclusory fashion that the 
Hospital "was bound and obligated to Plaintiff not to construct 
or permit the construction of additional facilities on its 
property for rental or occupancy by medical personnel practicing 
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at said hospital until such time as there was no more available 
space in Plaintiff fs facility, and then only by offering 
Plaintiff the opportunity to construct and provide such 
service." [R. 10-11] However, the agreements between the 
Development Company and the Hospital do not provide for any such 
obligation on the Hospital's part, nor did Development Company 
allege the agreements did so. 
10. Development Company alleged, on information and 
belief, that in planning and proceeding with the proposed 
development by Boyer of an additional professional building on 
the Hospital's property, Boyer and the Hospital acted 
"knowingly, willfully and in concert with each other" in 
soliciting Development Company's existing tenants to rent space 
in the proposed new facility and to not renew their present 
leases with the Development Company when they expire. The 
Development Company predictably concluded that Boyerfs actions 
in planning the development of a competing office building and 
soliciting tenants for that building once those tenants' leases 
with the Development Company expired "constitute a wrongful and 
unlawful interference with Plaintiff's present and prospective 
contractual relationships with third parties." [R. 14-15] 
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VI. 
ARGUMENT 
Faced with the simple indisputable fact that in all of 
its dealings and negotiations with the Hospital over the years, 
Development Company never requested, bargained for or received 
any agreement which would in any way limit the Hospital's right 
to use its property adjacent to that leased by Development 
Company in any manner which the Hospital sees fit, Development 
Company has desperately attempted in this action to come up with 
some colorable basis upon which to justify asking the courts to 
protect it from legitimate competition. The district court 
properly determined that there was simply no basis for the novel 
claims made by Development Company and properly dismissed the 
Complaint. 
As Boyer shall now demonstrate, Development Company is 
not entitled to preclude the Hospital from using its property 
for the construction of another office building as sought in the 
First Cause of Action and the allegations of the Third Cause of 
Action that Boyer tortiously interfered with Development 
Company's business relations are woefully insufficient to state 
a claim for relief. The Second Cause of Action seeks damages 
solely against the Hospital and will not be discussed in this 
Brief. 
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A. THE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY CANNOT PRECLUDE THE HOSPITAL 
FROM UTILIZING ITS PROPERTY FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF ANOTHER 
OFFICE BUILDING, 
Development Company makes a dogged attempt, both in its 
Complaint and in its Brief, to ignore and camouflage the single 
most important fact in this case. That is, that there is not 
one word in the agreements or communications between Development 
Company and the Hospital which prohibits the Hospital from using 
its own property to construct a new building or prevents the 
Hospital from dealing with Boyer or any other third party with 
respect to the construction, development or lease of a new 
building, or which gives Development Company any exclusive right 
to construct and lease any new building on the Hospital's 
property. Faced with the lack of any such provisions in the 
agreements, Development Company has attempted to manufacture 
such an obligation out of wholecloth and persuade this court to 
grant it protection from legitimate competition which 
Development Company never bargained for, paid for or obtained in 
its agreements with the Hospital. 
Because no written or even oral agreement exists or is 
alleged restricting the Hospital's use of the property, 
Development Company is left to essentially argue that the fact 
that construction and leasing of Development Company's buildings 
was intended to benefit the Hospital and that the parties 
contemplated a long, mutually advantageous relationship of 
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landlord and tenant is sufficient to entitle Development Company 
to dictate the use of the Hospital's property by implying 
restrictive covenants into the agreements between the parties. 
There is simply no basis in law for Development Company's 
position. 
The agreements between the Hospital and Development 
Company involve a lease of real property for a term in excess of 
one year. Consequently, those agreements were required to be 
in writing. Section 25-5-3 Utah Code Annotated (1953) ; SCM Land 
Company v. Watkins & Faber, 732 P.2d 105 (Utah 1986). A lessee 
cannot prevent its lessor from using its own adjacent property 
in any legally permissible manner absent a clearly expressed 
written agreement. Stockton Dry Goods Co. v. Girsh, 2 27 P.2d 1 
(Cal. 1951); Nevada Food King, Inc. v. Reno Press Brick Company, 
400 P.2d 140 (Nev. 1965); Carden Hall, Inc. v. George, 290 
N.Y.S.2d 430, 434 (1968); Matteucchi's Super Save Drug v. Hustad 
Corporation, 491 P.2d 705 (Mont. 1971); Fuller Market Basket, 
Inc. v. Gillingham & Jones, Inc., 539 P.2d 868 (Wash. 1975); 
Williams v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 424 P.2d 541, 548-49 (Kan. 
1967); Ready v. Texaco, Inc., 410 P.2d 983, 986 (Wyo. 1966). 
For example, in Stockton Dry Goods Co, supra, plaintiff 
owned a department store and entered into a written lease 
agreement with the defendant pursuant to which the defendant was 
given the right to lease and operate a shoe department in the 
store. The defendant claimed the sole and exclusive right to 
operate a shoe department based on the lease and conversations 
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between the parties. The California Supreme Court upheld the 
exclusion of any evidence as to an oral agreement and concluded 
that the lease did not give the lessee the exclusive right to 
operate a shoe department, observing: 
It is the defendant's contention that there is 
implicit in the lease of a portion of the store for 
the conduct of a shoe department an agreement on 
the part of the plaintiff that there would not be 
another shoe department conducted in the store. 
This is his contention despite the fact that such 
restrictive language is not in the lease and that 
a declaration to that effect would be to place a 
restriction upon the plaintiff's competition with 
the defendant and to create a covenant as to the 
use of the portion of the premises retained by the 
plaintiff without express provision therefore. 
A restrictive covenant as to property retained 
by a grantor or lessor must be evidenced by a 
clearly expressed intention [Citations omitted] 
for, as has been universally recognized, "where 
words do not amount to an agreement, covenant does 
not lie." [Citation omitted] 
The defendant has presented no decision where 
the court has read in the contract a provision for 
the restrictive covenant without language to 
support it. [227 P.2d at p. 3] 
Similarly, in Nevada Food Kincr, Inc. . supra, a lease for 
a shopping center contained an express restrictive covenant 
prohibiting the lessor from leasing or operating another grocery 
store in a certain specified area. The lessee sought to extend 
that restrictive covenant in order to fulfill what it claimed 
was the purpose and intent of the lease. The court refused to 
do so, stating: 
Of course, Nevada Food King is fearful that 
its business will be detrimentally affected if a 
competitor is permitted to do business on adjacent 
property of the lessor. Though conceding that the 
proposed supermarket will not be located within the 
area prohibited by the restrictive covenant, it 
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nevertheless asserts that the underlying purpose of 
that covenant is frustrated by the lower court's 
ruling..•• we cannot write a new lease for the 
parties to accommodate the lessee, nor will we 
depart from the well-established rule that a 
restrictive covenant being in restraint of trade, 
is to be strictly construed. [400 P.2d at p. 142] 
Finally, in Carden Hall, Inc., supra, the court granted 
summary judgment dismissing a Complaint seeking to limit the 
manner in which a tenant could use the leased premises, stating: 
Such covenants, being restrictive, are not 
favored by courts and, therefore, will not be 
extended by implication beyond the terms of the 
restriction since a party wishing to impose 
restrictions can do so by the use of clearly 
understandable language. [Citation omitted] The 
intention to restrict should be unmistakably 
expressed in the lease, it should not be a matter 
of inference. The one who seeks to enforce such 
restriction has the burden of demonstrating that it 
is sustained by a plain and natural interpretation 
of the language used. [Citation omitted] 
Some courts have indicated that in very narrow 
circumstances they would be willing to imply a restrictive 
covenant into a lease. These narrow circumstances were 
described by the court in Stockton Dry Goods, supra: 
The question may not be resolved by what the 
parties might have provided had they thought about 
it, nor by what the court might conclude regarding 
abstract fairness. The question of what is to be 
included in the contract is for the parties, not 
for the court, to determine. Here the defendant 
seeks to build an implied covenant upon an 
inference from the fact that there had always been 
but one shoe department in the store. The 
implication, however, cannot rest solely upon an 
inference to be drawn from the facts surrounding 
the execution of the lease. It must have a basis 
in the contract itself. ...[T]he court, in Cousins 
Inv. Co. v. Hastings Clothing Co... summarized the 
rules when covenants may be implied as follows: 
"(1) The implication must arise from the language 
used or it must be indispensable to effectuate the 
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intention of the parties; (2) it must appear from 
the language used that it was so clearly within the 
contemplation of the parties that they deemed it 
unnecessary to express it; (3) implied covenants 
can only be justified on the grounds of legal 
necessity; (4) a promise can be implied only where 
it can be rightfully assumed that it would have 
been made if attention had been called to it; (5) 
there can be no implied covenant where the subject 
is completely covered by the contract." [227 P.2d 
at 3-4] 
None of these requirements are met in the present case. 
There is no implication from the language of the agreements that 
the Hospital's use of its adjacent property would in any way be 
restricted nor is such an implication necessary to effectuate 
the intent of the leases. It does not appear from the language 
of the agreements that such a restriction was "so clearly within 
the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary 
to express it." In fact, the agreements are proof of just the 
opposite. The parties were very careful to document all of 
their agreements. When they reached an agreement on a matter, 
they expressed it in writing. Nor is there any legal necessity 
for implying a restriction. The only "necessity" is the 
Development Company's desire to be protected from competition. 
Finally, there is no basis for assuming the parties would have 
agreed to such a major restriction had the attention of the 
parties been called to it. 
The cases cited by Development Company in support of its 
argument that a restrictive covenant should be implied do not 
support that claim and in fact demonstrate the poverty of 
Development Company's position. 
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For example, Development Company relies upon Keating v. 
Preston, 108 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1940). In that case, the court 
found that the lease expressly gave the tenant the exclusive 
right to operate a restaurant and liquor business on the 
premises of a small hotel. Based on this finding, the appellate 
court simply enjoined the landlord from renting other space in 
the hotel to a third party for conducting a restaurant. 
Development Company also relies on Belvedere Hotel 
Company v. Williams, 113 A. 335 (Md. 1921), a case decided when 
Plessy v. Ferguson was still the law of the land. There, the 
lease between the parties expressly gave the tenant the 
exclusive right to operate a barbershop and manicuring 
establishment in the hotel. After the lease was entered into, 
the landlord leased the front room of an adjoining building to 
a barbershop. The court found that the adjoining building was 
connected with the hotel lobby through a doorway opening into 
what was called the "summer garden" and was therefore part of 
the hotel. The hotel therefore concluded that the second 
barbershop constituted a violation of the lease. 
Development Company's reliance upon Carter v. Alder, 291 
P.2d 111 (Cal.App. 1956) is similarly misplaced. In that case, 
the original landlords had given the tenant the exclusive right 
to operate a supermarket in a development known as "Valley 
Market Town" in Van Nuys, California. Sometime after the lease 
was entered into, the landlords sold their interest to 
plaintiffs who commenced planning the development of adjacent 
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land to be part of an expansion of "Valley Market Town." 
Plaintiffs then undertook negotiations with the tenants 
attempting to negotiate a release of their exclusive right to 
operate a supermarket within "Valley Market Town." The tenants 
refused to release such rights. Plaintiffs then determined that 
they would nevertheless construct and operate a supermarket on 
the adjacent property and "break" the tenants which were 
required to achieve minimum sales as part of the lease. 
Plaintiffs asserted they were fully entitled to operate a 
supermarket on the adjoining land because it was not part of the 
"Valley Market Town." The court rejected that contention, 
finding as a fact that the adjacent land was acquired in order 
to expand "Valley Market Town" and that it was in fact part of 
"Valley Market Town" so it was covered by the express exclusive 
right granted to the tenants. The court further found that 
plaintiffs were attempting by operating a competing supermarket 
to cut the tenant's income derived from its supermarket to the 
point that the landlord would have the right to terminate the 
lease. Of course, under the circumstances of that case, the 
court ruled against the landlord. 
Development Company cites Nixon & Nixon, Inc. v. John 
New & Associates, Inc.. 641 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1982) for the 
proposition that "a contract need not provide for every 
collateral matter or possible contingency." The Nixon case has 
nothing to do with the issues involved on this appeal. In 
Nixon, the District Court had refused specific performance of a 
16 
real estate contract on the basis that the contract was too 
vague for specific performance without specifying which 
provisions were faulty. The Utah Supreme Court simply held that 
the agreement was sufficiently certain as to its essential terms 
to warrant specific performance and that the failure to specify 
time for performance didn't matter because where no time is 
agreed upon for performance, the parties by law have a 
reasonable time to perform. The case had nothing to do with 
implying restrictive covenants into an agreement. Further, a 
covenant restricting the Hospital from developing its adjacent 
property is hardly some minor collateral matter that was not 
required to be included in the written agreements. 
The case of Quality Performance Lines v. Yo Ho 
Automotive, Inc., 609 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1980), cited by Develop-
ment Company, also has nothing to do with the issues before the 
court on this appeal. That case involved a dispute between the 
plaintiff and the defendant distributor of the plaintiff's brake 
shoes concerning, among other things, amounts plaintiff had 
allegedly overcharged the distributor for used brake shoe core 
deposits. The court only recognized that "an implied contract 
is 'one where the mutual intent [of the parties] is manifested 
by particular acts and attendant circumstances'" and that under 
the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, the court could imply aspects 
of an agreement from the parties' course of performance. Again, 
the case had nothing to do with implying restrictive covenants 
into agreements concerning real property. 
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Development Company argues that the Hospital restricted 
the type of tenants in the buildings which Development Company 
leases from the Hospital and insisted that those buildings not 
be used for commercial office space. Development Company 
concludes that, "[hjaving obtained what it bargained for from 
Plaintiff, Defendant Hospital should likewise be required to 
allow Plaintiff to achieve its reasonable expectations flowing 
from their contracts." [Development Company Brief, p. 21-22] 
This contention is nonsensical. More accurately, what 
Development Company is really saying is that because the 
Hospital bargained for and received a restriction on the type of 
tenancies in the Development Company's buildings, the 
Development Company should receive from the court something that 
it never bargained for or received from the Hospital — a 
restriction on the Hospital's use of its adjacent property. 
Development Company points to one paragraph in a June 
1979 agreement by which the Hospital agreed to "actively assist 
the partnership in acquiring and holding good tenants until such 
time as the new office building is completely occupied" as 
support for an implied restriction on the Hospital's use of its 
adjacent property. This argument is without merit. In the 
first place, this provision provides no basis for implying a 
restrictive covenant under the authorities cited above. 
Furthermore, there is no allegation anywhere in the Complaint 
that the Hospital breached any obligation to actively assist 
Development Company in this regard. 
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Finally, Development Company half-heartedly argues that 
it ought to be allowed discovery before its Complaint is 
dismissed. However, Development Company's case must stand or 
fall on the specific provisions of the written agreements which 
were all before the court. Development Company is not entitled 
to use discovery as a device for attempting to come up with some 
basis for a lawsuit. Boyer should simply not be put to the 
expense of defending this action while Development Company 
wanders through discovery in search of a theory and facts to 
somehow justify this case. 
In conclusion, Development Company conceded in the court 
below that restrictive covenants are not favored, but argued 
"they are enforceable if carefully drawn to protect any 
legitimate interest." [R. 132] Development Company simply 
cannot escape the fact that there is in the present case no 
restrictive covenant, carefully drawn or not, in the agreements 
with the Hospital. As the district court stated in granting the 
motions to dismiss: 
The plaintiff wants me to find that there is 
an agreement between the parties that the 
defendants may not build on this property without 
first offering the plaintiff the opportunity to 
build similar buildings. There is no specific 
language in any contract which provides for that. 
The suggestion next is that there is an 
implied agreement that that's the case. If so, it 
would be a restrictive covenant restricting the use 
of property. And as has been pointed out by I 
think all parties, those are not favored in the 
law. And even by acknowledgement of the Plaintiff 
that those kinds of contracts or covenants will be 
enforced if they are carefully drawn to protect a 
legitimate interest. And I find that there is no 
such clause in the contract that's carefully drawn 
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and protecting a legitimate interest. [Transcript 
of August 30, 1989 hearing, R. 205 at p. 34-35] 
The District Court's decision in this regard was correct and 
should be confirmed. 
B. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST BOYER 
FOR INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC RELATIONS. 
Development Company alleges in the Third Cause of Action 
of the Complaint that Boyer's alleged actions in planning the 
construction of a new office building on the Hospital's property 
and in soliciting Development Company's tenants to rent space in 
the proposed new building once their leases with Development 
Company expire somehow constitutes a "wrongful and unlawful 
interference" with Development Company's contractual 
relationships with its tenants. It is important to note in this 
regard that there is absolutely no allegation or intimation that 
Boyer or the Hospital has attempted to persuade Development 
Company's tenants to breach their existing leases or that Boyer 
or the Hospital have made any misrepresentations or otherwise 
unfairly competed for the tenants. The Complaint only alleges 
that Boyer and the Hospital have sought to have the tenants 
choose new office space once their leases are at an end. 
There can be no doubt under the law but that Boyer is 
perfectly entitled to compete with Development Company for the 
future business of Development Company's tenants so long as 
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Boyer does not act with an improper purpose or with improper 
means. Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 
(Utah 1982); Marmis v. Solot Co. , 573 P.2d 899, 902 (Ariz. 1977) 
("tortious interference does not occur through lawful 
competition.11) In Ulan v. Vend-a-Coin, Inc., 558 P. 2d 741, 745 
(Ariz. 1976), the court reversed a jury verdict in favor of 
plaintiff on an interference with business expectancy claim, 
observing: 
Thus, it may be gleaned that the privilege to 
engage in business and to compete with others 
implies the additional privilege to induce third 
persons to do their business with the actor rather 
than with his competitors. 
It is well settled that in order to state a claim for 
relief for interference with prospective economic relations, 
Development Company is required to allege facts showing: (1) 
that Boyer intentionally interfered with Development Company's 
existing or potential economic relations; (2) for an improper 
purpose or by an improper means; and (3) causing injury to 
Development Company. Leigh Furniture, supra.; Sampson v. 
Richins, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). Development Company 
has failed to even approach alleging the necessary facts in this 
regard. 
All Development Company has alleged is that Boyer 
attempted to solicit Development Company's tenants to enter into 
leases with Boyer once their leases with Development Company are 
at an end. There was nothing improper with that attempt. Nor 
is there any sufficient allegation in the Complaint that Boyer 
21 
acted with an improper purpose. In order to state a claim, 
Development Company was required to allege facts showing that 
the predominant purpose of Boyer's conduct was to injure 
Development Company and that Boyer's actions were maliciously 
motivated. Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, supra; 
Sampson v. Richins, supra. See also. Top Service Body Shop, 
Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 582 P.2d 1365 (Ore. 1978). For 
example, in Leigh Furniture, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
In the rough and tumble of the marketplace, 
competitors inevitably damage one another in the 
struggle for personal advantage. The law offers no 
remedy for those damages — even if intentional — 
because they are an inevitable by-product of 
competition. The problems inherent in proving 
motivation or purpose make it prudent for 
commercial conduct to be regulated for the most 
part by the improper means alternative, which 
typically requires only a showing of particular 
conduct. 
The alternative of improper purpose would be 
satisfied where it can be shown that the actor's 
predominant purpose was to injure the plaintiff. 
[657 P.2d at 307] [Emphasis added] 
Development Company argues in its brief [p. 24-25] that 
its allegation in paragraph 41 of the Complaint should be enough 
for pleading purposes to satisfy the requirement of alleging 
improper means or purpose. Paragraph 41 only alleged on 
information and belief that Boyer and the Hospital "in planning 
and proceeding with the proposed development of an additional 
professional building on the Defendant Hospital's property ... 
acted knowingly, willfully and in concert with each other, with 
the intent and purpose of depriving Plaintiff of its rights to 
the continued contractual relations with tenants." Under the 
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authorities cited above, this allegation is far from sufficient. 
There are no facts alleged showing any improper means and 
Development Company's mere characterizations cannot make proper 
conduct improper. Boyer was perfectly entitled to plan the 
building and compete for tenants. Nor has Development Company 
alleged (nor could it consistent with its obligations under Rule 
11) that Boyer's predominant purpose was to injure Development 
Company. In essence, all Development Company has alleged in 
paragraph 41 is that Boyer and the Hospital acted together 
intentionally to solicit tenants. 
Finally, Development Company was granted leave to amend 
this claim to attempt to allege additional facts which would be 
sufficient to state a claim for relief. Apparently recognizing 
that it had no facts to support this claim, Development Company 
decided not to amend, but rather elected to stand on the vague 
conclusory allegations contained in its original Complaint. 
The Third Cause of Action falls far short of stating a 
claim and was properly dismissed by the district court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Hospital and Development Company and its 
predecessors were very careful to document in writing all of 
their agreements over the years. There is no allegation in the 
Complaint that Development Company or its predecessors were not 
represented by counsel or were unsophisticated or unable to 
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protect themselves in their negotiations with the Hospital. The 
agreements between the parties contain many obligations and 
covenants on the part of Development Company and the Hospital, 
However, no matter how many of the provisions of the agreements 
which Development Company attempts to cite in order to give some 
plausible basis for its attempt to restrict the Hospital from 
the use of its own property, one fact is pre-eminent, and that 
is, that the Hospital never agreed to restrict its use of its 
adjacent property and Development Company never bargained for, 
paid for or obtained such an agreement. 
Development Company is not entitled to be protected from 
legitimate competition from Boyer any more than Boyer is 
entitled to be protected from legitimate competition from 
Development Company. Development Company's remedy is not to 
seek a monopoly from the courts, but rather to do a better job 
with its buildings. 
The district court's Order of Dismissal should be 
affirmed. 
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